On the Israel-Lebanon War and the Possible US Escalation in Iraq (or, Just Say No)

A short while ago I wrote a post about my army service in the West Bank. This wasn't simply a redemption piece but also an attempt to reflect on the situation American soldiers face in Iraq. Like them, I was certain I was doing the right thing, and like them, I thought everything I was doing was done in the (self-)defense of my country. Similarly, the implications of the recent Israeli war in Lebanon should be considered with Iraq in mind.

Like the US, the Israeli army was undoubtedly going in with superior military force for what was supposed to be a short offensive, and like in Iraq, it was immediately shown to be a mistake. Many Israeli soldiers died, attacks on Israeli civilians increased, and radical Islamic forces legitimized their relative control. A month into the conflict, the Israeli government was forced to choose what many considered the best of two evils: a retreat or an escalation.

Now, as Americans are divided about the future in Iraq, and as Democratic hopefuls are still afraid of saying the US should leave immediately, it is important to see what happened after the Israeli army left Lebanon. First, and most importantly, the number of casualties on both sides, including civilians, was about 2000 for the one month of conflict (between mid-July and mid-August of 2006). There is no reason to think this trend would have decreased if the fighting had continued at the same pace, and an escalation would have undoubtedly only increased the number of fatalities.

Second, as one of the reasons for remaining in Iraq is a flawed domino theory that scares us into thinking a retreat would destroy American prestige and, more importantly, its power of deterrence, we can first look at the current situation, where the war has created a diminishing American military might, encouraging other nations to rise up, at least rhetorically, against US hegemony. And second, we need to look again at Israel. Retreating after one month from the Lebanon mistake did not diminish Israeli hegemony in the region. If anything, Israel has since regained the power it had lost during the war. Moreover, while the war helped legitimize the Hezbollah, its victory did not create the nightmare scenario the Israeli government was advancing before the war to convince the public this was a no-choice war. Neither Hezbollah nor Syria have any more control over the Lebanese government then they did before, and the risk of Israeli destruction or of future attacks has not grown.

When Democratic hopefuls are asked about their solution for the war, they often either avoid the question by stating the obvious (It's Bush's mess), or endorse a phased, "dignified" withdrawal. This is not enough, not anymore. When the Republican keyboard warriors come with catchy, meaningless slogans like Cut-and-Run, the answer should be Study the Israel-Lebanon War. Sure, it's not as catchy, but it happens to be the truth. When the Israeli government chose retreat over escalation, it put the safety of its citizens first and political prestige second. The future leaders of America should have the courage to do the same.